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CLOUDY WITH A CHANCE OF CONVICTION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
CUTS THROUGH THE FOG OF WHAT CONDUCT QUALIFIES
AS AN AGGRAVATED FELONY UNDER THE INA BY
HOLDING § 16(B) UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
IN BAPTISTE v. ATTORNEY GENERAL
KENNEDY A. COSTANTINO*
“These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the
stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction. The importance of
accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes
has never been more important.”1
I. THE FORECAST: CRIMES OF VIOLENCE
IN IMMIGRATION LAW

AND

THEIR ROLE

Imagine the following scenario: a client walks into your office and
tells you they have been charged with a felony in the third degree for
failing to stop their vehicle as directed by a police officer.2 The client is a
lawful permanent resident, but not a United States citizen.3 The client
wants legal advice on whether, under a guilty plea, this conduct will constitute a crime of violence.4 A “crime of violence” makes a noncitizen deportable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).5 Currently,
the answer to that question varies depending on the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals that the case is before.6 A crime of violence under 18
* J.D., Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, 2017; B.A.,
Bucknell University, 2012. I would like to thank my mother and Evan Holland for
their love, encouragement, and support. I could not have done this without you. I
would also like to thank Professor Caitlin Barry for inspiring my interest in
immigration law. Finally, thank you to all of the members of the VILLANOVA LAW
REVIEW for their help throughout this process.
1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (discussing immigration law
reform’s increase of number of immigrants subject to removal and stressing importance of noncitizens understanding impact of committing any crimes).
2. See Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 2016) (describing
plaintiff, Golicov, who was charged with third degree felony and later charged as
removable for committing crime of violence under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)). The facts of the hypothetical scenario posed in the text accompanying this footnote are based on the factual background of Golicov.
3. See Golicov, 837 F.3d at 1067 (explaining immigration status of plaintiff).
4. See generally Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 (illustrating intricacies of providing accurate legal advice to immigrant clients).
5. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (West 2014) (listing “crime of violence” as
offense that makes noncitizen subject to removal).
6. Compare United States v. Coronado-Cura, 713 F.3d 597, 600 (11th Cir.
2013) (holding fleeing from police officer was crime of violence), with Penuliar v.
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603, 609–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding fleeing confrontation with
police officer was not crime of violence).

(505)
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U.S.C. § 16(b) (§ 16(b)) is defined as a crime that “involves a substantial
risk that physical force . . . may be used in the course of committing the
offense.”7 The Ninth Circuit has held that intentionally fleeing a police
officer is not a crime of violence because there is not a substantial risk of
violence in driving away in a car.8 The Eleventh Circuit, however, has held
that failing to stop a car after receiving a police officer’s orders is a crime
of violence because when an individual flees in a vehicle, it creates the
substantial risk of a car crash and, therefore, injury.9 Given this information, how would you advise your client as to whether the conduct committed constitutes a crime of violence?10
This is just one example of the uncertainty that has resulted in the
federal circuit courts over what conduct qualifies as a crime of violence.11
This confusion not only highlights the deepening split in the federal circuit courts over whether § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, but also demonstrates the difficulty practitioners face in advising clients about the
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) (defining crime of violence). Congress expanded
conduct for which noncitizens could be deported with an amendment to the INA
in 1988. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Healey, Note, Sobering Consequences for Aliens Convicted
of Felony DUI: Is Drunk Driving a Crime of Violence Under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)?, 8 SUFFOLK
J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 97, 100 n.23 (2003) (citing Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988).
These new offenses included aggravated felonies. See id. at 100. The definition of
an aggravated felony was amended in 1990 by the Immigration Act of 1990 and the
phrase crime of violence was added. See id.
8. See Penuliar, 528 F.3d at 609–10 (determining evading police officer via car
was not “willful or wanton” conduct constituting crime of violence).
9. See Coronado-Cura, 713 F.3d at 600 (holding fleeing confrontation with police officer creates risk of car crash and resulting injury).
10. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (recognizing importance of “accurate legal advice” for those who face severe consequences such as
deportation); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1299, 1301–03 (2011) (stressing importance that immigrants understand the
impact of conviction that could subject them to deportation); Sejal Zota, How
Johnson v. United States May Help Your Crime of Violence Case, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT NAT’L LAWS. GUILD (July 6, 2015), https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/
PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/crim/2015_06Jul_johnson-cov.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SW9-CFWT] (discussing difficulty attorneys experience when
counseling clients about immigration consequences of certain crimes and “thereby
leaving their clients unable to make knowing and intelligent pleas”).
11. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text for a hypothetical scenario
based on the factual background of Golicov that presents challenges for counsel.
See also Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Immigrant Defense Project, American Immigration Lawyers Association, and National
Immigrant Justice Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5–18,
Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016) (No. 15-1498), 2016 WL 7664491 [hereinafter Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild] (describing several examples where circuit courts have arrived at different conclusions
about whether similar conduct constitutes crime of violence). Further instances of
disagreement among the courts include: “residential trespass, unauthorized use of
a vehicle, fleeing from an officer, unlawful imprisonment, stalking, reckless offenses, and firearms possession. The only predictable outcomes are continued disagreements among the courts and continued harms to immigrants.” See id. at 6–7.
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immigration consequences of particular crimes.12 The Third Circuit, in
Baptiste v. Attorney General,13 recently provided clarity and validity to this
controversial and previously unclear definition of “crime of violence.”14
This Casebrief suggests that the Third Circuit’s holding in Baptiste correctly determined that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, thereby eliminating a criminal provision that produced non-uniform and unpredictable
results in an area of law already rife with confusion.15
Part II of this Casebrief will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson v. United States,16 which held a statute similar to § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague and opened the door for challenges to crime of violence
statutes.17 Part II will also discuss the circuit split that has occurred over
whether § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.18 Part III will examine the
facts, procedure, and analysis by the Third Circuit in Baptiste, as well as
compare the Third Circuit’s rationale to that of other circuits that have
addressed the same issue.19 Part IV concludes that the Third Circuit gave
clarity to a vague immigration law and opened the door for immigrants to
be eligible for certain forms of relief that they previously had been barred
from.20 Finally, Part V briefly discusses the impact of the Baptiste decision
12. See, e.g., Laura Murray-Tjan, Immigration Law: Raise Your Hand If You Understand, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lauramurraytjan/immigration-law-raise-you_b_4766726.html [https://perma.cc/396NBE27] (explaining widespread confusion over immigration laws and describing immigration laws as “dizzying” (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 378)).
13. 841 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, Sessions v. Baptiste, No.
16-978 (Feb. 6, 2017).
14. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 616–17 (holding crime of violence unconstitutionally vague); see also Gerald Seipp, Third Circuit Joins Sister Circuits in Finding 18 USCA
§ 16(b)’s “Crime of Violence” Language, Incorporated into INA § 101(a)(43)(F), Is Void for
Vagueness, 93 INTERPRETER RELEASES ART., no. 45, Nov. 21, 2016, at 13 (describing
Baptiste decision to join four other circuit courts in finding crime of violence unconstitutional in immigration context); Kevin Penton, Federal ‘Crime of Violence’
Standard Vague, 3rd Circ. Says, LAW360 (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:22 PM), https://www.law360
.com/articles/860779/federal-crime-of-violence-standard-vague-3rd-circ-says
[https://perma.cc/FMA4-UYVL] (commenting on Third Circuit’s ruling in context of circuit split on issue and Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari to similar
case).
15. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 623 (stating crime of violence provision produced
too much unpredictability); see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for
Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2016) (explaining confusion that
surrounds area of immigration law).
16. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
17. For a discussion of § 16(b) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson,
see infra notes 22–53 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the different circuit court decisions and their reasoning on whether § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, see infra notes 54–79 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of Baptiste, how the Third Circuit arrived at its decision,
and the importance of the holding, see infra notes 80–128 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit’s decision will impact practitioners and those within the Third Circuit, see infra notes 129–59 and accompanying
text.
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within the Third Circuit, and the possible future of § 16(b) as the statute
heads to the Supreme Court for a decision on its constitutionality.21
II. STORM’S

A

BREWIN’: THE APPLICATION
TO IMMIGRATION

OF

CRIMES

OF

VIOLENCE

The crime of violence definition under § 16(b) is a term incorporated into many statutes, including the INA.22 But in 2015, in Johnson v.
United States,23 the Supreme Court issued a ruling that called into question
the constitutionality of the crime of violence definition.24 This ruling
held the definition unconstitutionally vague as it was incorporated into the
Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) residual clause.25 A stream of litigation ensued surrounding the constitutionality of similar statutes, like the
INA, that included the definition.26 Significantly, not all circuit courts
that have addressed the constitutionality of § 16(b) as incorporated under
the INA have interpreted Johnson in the same way, which has lead to confusion over what crimes constitute a “crime of violence.”27
21. For a discussion of the importance of the Baptiste decision within the
Third Circuit, and the future of § 16(b) as it heads to the Supreme Court in 2017,
see infra notes 161–67 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (West 2014) (describing all crimes
including “crime of violence” which constitute an aggravated felony under INA
and make a noncitizen subject to removal); see Steven Kalar, Case o’ the Week: Welcome Clarity on Vagueness—Dimaya and Extension of Johnson to the Immigration (Civil)
Context, NINTH CIRCUIT BLOG (Oct. 25, 2015), http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2015/
10/case-o-week-welcome-clarity-on.html [https://perma.cc/PC7K-T43T] (listing
statutes that use “crime of violence” and similar definitions); see also Zota, supra
note 10 (explaining how Johnson can help with other statutes that include “crime of
violence” definitions).
23. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
24. See id. at 2558 (2015) (holding crime of violence definition under residual
clause of Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) unconstitutionally vague).
25. See id. (determining crime of violence provision created too much “unpredictability” for it to withstand scrutiny under Due Process Clause). See generally 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (2012) (defining crime of violence).
26. See, e.g., Carissa Hessick, Assessing the Impact of Johnson v. United States on
the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, CASETEXT (Oct. 24, 2016), https://casetext.com/
posts/assessing-the-impact-of-johnson-v-united-states-on-the-void-for-vagueness-doctrine [https://perma.cc/H33H-U7MK] (commenting on large number of cases in
wake of Johnson ruling); Allissa Wickham, Supreme Court Case May Reduce Deportation
Uncertainty, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2016, 10:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
846476/supreme-court-case-may-reduce-deportation-uncertainty [https://perma
.cc/N7FK-EEQE] (“The deluge of crime of violence rulings came in light of the
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. U.S.”).
27. See Bradley Henry, Dimaya: Does Johnson Apply to the Immigration Code?,
HENRY LAW FIRM PLLC (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.henrylawny.com/dimaya-johnson-apply-immigration-code/ [https://perma.cc/AJU5-TW74] (commenting on
circuit split over constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)); see also Wickham, supra
note 26 (explaining how Ninth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have disagreed
with Fifth Circuit on whether § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague).
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Significance of § 16(b) and Johnson’s Impact on Statutes Involving
the Phrase “Crime of Violence”

In 1952, the INA was signed into law.28 The INA governs the immigration laws of the United States.29 One provision of the INA specifically
states that non-citizens can be removed from the United States if they are
convicted of aggravated felonies.30 An aggravated felony under the INA
includes all crimes of violence for which an individual has been jailed for
“at least one year.”31 A crime of violence is defined as either: (a) an offense where the perpetrator uses, attempts, or threatens to use force to
commit the crime or, (b) any offense that presents a “substantial risk” of
the use of force during the commission of the crime and for which the
offender is jailed for a year or more.32 Part (b) of this definition has come
under much scrutiny both on its own and for its incorporation in the
INA.33
The crime of violence definition is used throughout several federal
laws.34 However, the Supreme Court has declared the term void for
vagueness in at least one of those other areas.35 In Johnson, the Supreme
28. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (1953)); see also Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis
.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/C4P4-NEYE] (last
updated Sept. 10, 2013) (providing brief overview of Immigration and Nationality
Act).
29. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537; see also Developments in the Law Immigration and
Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646–47 (1953) (describing creation and intended
purpose of Act).
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”). A noncitizen convicted of
an aggravated felony makes them not only removable, but the conviction also
makes them an ineligible for various forms of relief to stop their deportation. See
Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, supra note
11, at 25 n.21 (listing forms of relief not available to immigrants convicted of aggravated felonies); see also Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1635 (2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining consequences of aggravated felony conviction (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3))).
31. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (West 2014) (listing crime of violence as
qualifying aggravated felony offense).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) (defining crime of violence).
33. See, e.g., Sejal Zota, Practice Advisory: Crimes of Violence, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWS. GUILD (Apr. 10, 2012), https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/crim/2012_10Apr_crimesviolence.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8GK-83Y6] (explaining confusion surrounding
crime of violence definition and subsequent litigation).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) (2008) (using term crime of violence in Bail
Reform Act); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016) (providing crime of violence definition for Career Offenders and
Criminal Livelihood sentencing guidelines); see also Kalar, supra note 22 (listing
other statutes with crime of violence provisions).
35. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (holding
residual clause void for vagueness); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (defining
“crime of violence” in federal sentencing statute as “an offense that is a felony
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Court looked at whether § 16(b) was unconstitutional as incorporated
under the ACCA’s catchall provision, otherwise known as the “residual
clause,” which included all other conduct that may present the risk of injury but was not been expressly listed in the statute.36 Under the ACCA,
anyone who has previously been convicted of three violent felonies automatically receives a harsher sentence.37 The ACCA defines a “violent felony” by listing four specific crimes and includes a catchall provision to
encompass “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”38 In Johnson, the Supreme Court asked the parties to
specifically address whether this catchall residual clause was impermissibly
vague.39 A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it is so unclear that it
causes people have to speculate its meaning and results in arbitrary
application.40
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held the residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague.41 The Court determined that courts must apply a “catand . . . involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property
of another may be used in the court of committing the offense”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining “violent felony” term in federal sentencing statute as
felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another”).
36. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (explaining that what crimes fall under
residual clause has been continual issue for courts). The petitioner, Johnson, had
already been convicted of three prior violent felonies when he pled guilty to a
fourth felony. See id. Johnson was given an enhanced sentence due to his prior
convictions and he appealed arguing that one of previous felonies should not have
been classified as a “violent” felony. See id.; see also Katherine Brady, Some Felonies
Should No Longer Be “Crimes of Violence” for Immigration Purposes, Under Johnson v.
United States, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. 1 (Aug. 2015), https://www.ilrc
.org/sites/default/files/resources/johnson_v_us_ilrc_adv_8_2015_pdf_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/38Y8-A9RN] (discussing Johnson decision, its effect on § 16(b),
and INA provision regarding crime of violence).
37. See Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) § 1802, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
(2012); see also Jaime M. Nies, Annotation, Retroactive Effect of Johnson v. U.S., 135
S. Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015), Holding That “Residual Clause” of Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA) Is Unconstitutional, 13 A.L.R. FED. 3D ART. 3, at II(A) (2016)
(explaining residual clause of Armed Career Criminal Act).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555–56
(reiterating definition of ACCA’s residual clause).
39. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (discussing procedural history); see also Katherine Menendez, Johnson v. United States: Don’t Go Away, 31 CRIM. JUST. 12, 15
(2016) (explaining court initially agreed to hear case but asked parties to reargue
case to address whether residual clause was unconstitutionally vague).
40. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–57 (stating laws violate Due Process and are
void for vagueness when they do not provide fair notice of the type of conduct
prohibited under the law); see also Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926) (establishing vagueness standard for when court can determine law unconstitutionally vague).
41. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563 (holding). See generally Armed Career Criminal
Act—Residual Clause—Johnson v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 301 (2015)
(summarizing Johnson). The Supreme Court held in a subsequent case that Johnson’s ruling applied retroactively. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265
(2016).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss3/2

6

Costantino: Cloudy With a Chance of Conviction: The Third Circuit Cuts Throug

2017]

CASEBRIEF

511

egorical approach” to analyze whether the statute was void for
vagueness.42 The categorical approach is a method that requires a court
to look at the general type of conduct a statute meant to include—an “ordinary case”—and then to determine whether the conduct at issue fits
within the imagined conduct the statute intended to protect.43
Looking at the statute through this lens, the Court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague for two reasons.44 First, the crime of violence definition left unclear how judges should determine the risk a crime
presents.45 The Court held that the provision forced judges to determine
the risk of the crime based on an “ordinary case” and not based upon the
real-life facts of the case at issue.46 The Court questioned how a judge was
supposed to determine what constituted an “ordinary case” and held this
inquiry too speculative to be fair.47
Second, the Court held that the words “serious potential risk” left
judges to guess at “how much risk” of physical injury a crime needed to
42. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
600 (1990)) (acknowledging requirement for courts to undertake categorical approach to analysis of ACCA residual clause); see also Armed Career Criminal Act—
Residual Clause—Johnson v. United States, supra note 41, at 303 (explaining
Court’s rationale for adopting categorical approach).
43. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (“[A] court assesses whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony ‘in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms
of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.’ ”
(quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008))). See generally Simon
Azar-Farr, Untangling Categorical and Modified Approaches in Immigration Law, 15–12
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 Dec. 2015, at 2–3 (recounting background of categorical approach and how it is applied).
44. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (analyzing case under categorical approach and using two question inquiry to determine statute’s constitutionality); see
also Armed Career Criminal Act—Residual Clause—Johnson v. United States, supra
note 41, at 303 (describing Court’s two-prong reasoning for holding ACCA
residual clause void for vagueness).
45. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (questioning how judges should apply
“imagined” ordinary case to “real-world facts”); see also Koh, supra note 15, at
1149–50 (describing Johnson Court’s reasoning in holding statute provided lack of
guidance to judges).
46. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (holding residual clause provided “no reliable way” of determining what the “ordinary case” of crime was); see also Koh, supra
note 15, at 1147–48 (reiterating Court’s hesitance to define “ordinary case” for
every crime). To explain the fundamental problem in deciding what constituted
an “ordinary case” of a crime, the Supreme Court provided examples. See Johnson,
135 S. Ct. at 2557–58. For instance, the Court pondered what the typical case of
witness tampering involved. See id. at 2557. Did it include threatening behavior?
See id. Or did it include simply a bribe? See id. The Court held there were so many
ways a crime could take place that a judge would have to engage in a guessing
game to determine whether the crime fit the statute. See id. at 2557–58.
47. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (“How does one go about deciding what
kind of conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves? ‘A statistical analysis of the
state reporter? A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?’ ” (quoting
United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting))); see also Zota, supra note 10 (recounting court’s speculation over “lack of
connection” between imagined case and elements of case at issue).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 2

512

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 505

present to be classified as a violent felony; what the Court called a “serious
risk inquiry.”48 Further adding to the confusion was the fact that the
residual clause followed an enumerated list of other crimes, including burglary and arson, which courts were to consider crimes of violence.49 The
Court held each of these crimes involved a different amount of risk and,
therefore, the list made the necessary amount of risk for an offense to
qualify as a crime of violence “far from clear.”50 Taken together, these
factors demonstrated that the ACCA’s residual clause created a level of
unpredictability in interpretation that made the statute unconstitutionally
vague.51 Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that not all crimes that
include “serious potential risk” or similar terms were unconstitutional per
se.52 The ACCA’s residual clause was unique “because the elements necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are uncertain . . . [and therefore]
this abstract inquiry offers significantly less predictability than one that
deals with the actual . . . facts.”53
B.

How Different Circuits Have Interpreted Johnson,
Resulting in a Circuit Split

The decision in Johnson opened the door to challenges of other, similar statutes, specifically the aforementioned § 16(b).54 Four circuits that
48. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (emphasis added) (noting degree of risk
hard to apply to imagined “ordinary case” crime); see also Azar-Farr, supra note 43
(explaining Supreme Court’s aversion to having judges assess possibly “attenuated”
risk involved in imagined crimes).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means
any crime . . . that . . . is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another . . . .”); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (noting residual clause asks for risk
involved in crime of violence to be evaluated “in light of” other crimes listed in
ACCA statute); see also Koh, supra note 15, at 1151–52 (commenting list of crimes
in statute supported court’s determination statute was unconstitutionally vague,
but was not “dispositive” reason and court overall “anchored its concerns in the
instability inherent in the ‘ordinary case’ approach”).
50. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558; see also Armed Career Criminal Act—Residual
Clause—Johnson v. United States, supra note 41, at 304 (acknowledging how Johnson Court found ACCA confusing because it suggested risk involved in crime of
violence be compared to risk involved with other listed crimes).
51. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (explaining why ACCA is unconstitutionally
vague); see also Armed Career Criminal Act—Residual Clause—Johnson v. United
States, supra note 41, at 304 (recognizing Justice Scalia’s statement that disagreement in circuit courts over statute was itself evidence of confusion and inconsistent
application).
52. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560–61 (disagreeing with dissent’s statement
that holding residual clause unconstitutional means all statutes with terms “substantial risk,” “grave risk,” and “unreasonable risk” are also unconstitutional).
53. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561 (explaining reason why residual clause was
different from other statutes with similar textual language (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Int’l Harvester Co. of
Amer. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223 (1914))).
54. See Wickham, supra note 26 (noting “deluge” of cases about crime of violence statutes after ruling in Johnson).
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addressed the issue have held § 16(b) void for vagueness.55 However, one
circuit, the Fifth Circuit, has held that § 16(b) is constitutional.56
The first circuit to address the constitutionality of § 16(b) was the
Ninth Circuit in Dimaya v. Lynch,57 which held the statute impermissibly
vague.58 In that case, the Department of Homeland Security sought to
deport the defendant on the grounds that he had committed an aggravated felony, a crime of violence under § 16(b).59
The Ninth Circuit compared § 16(b) to the statute held unconstitutional in Johnson and found the language in both to be incredibly similar.60 Due to the similarities between the statutes, the Ninth Circuit found
that § 16(b) must be analyzed under the same categorical approach as the
statute in Johnson.61 Further, the court found that § 16(b) was subject to
the “same constitutional defects” that plagued the statute in Johnson.62
The Ninth Circuit reiterated the reasons, namely: a lack of guidance on
how to determine the level of risk a crime presents, and a lack of guidance
55. See Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding
§ 16(b) void for vagueness); Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 447 (6th Cir. 2016)
(same); United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (same);
Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015) (same).
56. See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 672 (5th Cir. 2016)
(en banc) (holding § 16(b) was not unconstitutionally vague).
57. 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015).
58. See id. at 1120 (determining § 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague); see also
“Violent Felony” and “Crime of Violence”: What Johnson v. United States Can Mean For
Other Federal Criminal Statutes Involving Violent Crimes, BURNHAM & GOROKHOV,
PLLC: LEGAL BLOG (June 29, 2016), http://www.burnhamgorokhov.com/violentfelony-crime-violence-johnson-v-united-states-can-mean-federal-criminal-statutes-involving-violent-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/G8Q4-AGL5] (stating Ninth Circuit was
first appellate court to rule on validity of § 16(b) after Johnson).
59. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111–12 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(2012)) (explaining Dimaya was non-citizen and conviction for aggravated felony
makes non-citizen subject to removal). Petitioner, Dimaya, had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1992. See id. at 1112. In 2007 and again
in 2009, Dimaya was convicted of first degree residential burglary and received two
years of jail time for each conviction. See id. Dimaya challenged the finding that
his first-degree burglary conviction constituted a crime of violence. See id.
60. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1114–19 (contrasting definition at issue in Johnson
to definition of crime of violence under § 16(b) and concluding both states were
“similar” with only minor differences). The Ninth Circuit highlighted the Supreme Court’s statement that immigration laws need to have “efficiency, fairness,
and predictability.” See id. at 1114 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit also emphasized that vague immigration statutes hinder the ability of noncitizens to understand the consequences of pleading guilty to a crime. See id.
61. See id. at 1114–15 (stating both provisions must be analyzed under same
method of inquiry). The categorical approach was first established in Taylor v.
United States. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Taylor’s approach requires a court to examine
the elements of the “generic” offense or ordinary case, and not undertake a factspecific inquiry of the case at hand. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02.
62. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1115 (comparing § 16(b) to Johnson’s residual
clause and finding § 16(b) also failed Johnson’s two-prong analysis); see also Brady,
supra note 36 (arguing same features that made residual clause vague also made
§ 16(b) vague).
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on how to assess the amount of risk a crime must have to qualify as a crime
of violence.63
The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that § 16(b)
was unlike the ACCA’s residual clause because the residual clause included an enumerated list of crimes that added to the confusion of the
statute.64 The court stated that while an enumerated list may have added
to the confusion, the central reason the Supreme Court found the
residual clause unconstitutional was the risk of arbitrary application of the
“serious potential risk” standard when applied to the imagined ordinary
case.65 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the government’s argument that
§ 16(b) was unlike the ACCA’s residual clause because the residual clause
required a determination of risk after the crime occurred; whereas § 16(b)
required a determination of risk during the commission of the offense.66
The court rejected this argument as well and stated that, while it doubted
that a distinction existed, the same reasoning would apply in either case.67
The Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits followed the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Dimaya, each finding § 16(b) to be unconstitutionally vague.68
In each case, the circuit courts held that although the language of § 16(b)
and the statute in Johnson were not identical, they were “substantially
equivalent.”69 Significantly, the Tenth Circuit noted (and the Sixth Cir63. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1116 (“The Court’s reasoning applies with equal
force to the similar statutory language and identical mode of analysis used to define a crime of violence for purposes of the INA.”).
64. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1117 (disagreeing with government’s and, consequently, dissent’s opinions that unlike Johnson’s residual clause, § 16(b) was not
arbitrary because it did not require judges to evaluate risk of crime of violence in
context of other crimes).
65. See id. at 1117 (recognizing differences between § 16(b) and residual
clause).
66. See id. at 1118–19 (explaining government’s argument that timing of risk
assessment during, rather than after, commission of crime is significant).
67. See id. (holding categorical approach applies regardless of whether looking at conduct before, during, or after commission of crime).
68. See Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding
§ 16(b) void for vagueness in wake of Dimaya); Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 447
(6th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 720 (7th Cir.
2015) (same); see also Sarah Flinn, Definition of Crime of Violence for Illegal Reentry
Sentencing Is Unconstitutionally Vague, CRIMMIGATION (Feb. 4, 2016, 4:00 AM), http:/
/crimmigration.com/2016/02/04/definition-of-crime-of-violence-for-illegal-reen
try-sentencing-is-unconstitutionally-vague/ [https://perma.cc/Y2EH-JT7F] (noting Ninth Circuit was first court to address constitutionality of § 16(b) after Johnson); Wickham, supra note 26 (explaining other circuit courts finding Dimaya
persuasive).
69. See Golicov, 837 F.3d at 1072–73 (“[S]ection 16(b) is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA’s residual clause . . . .” (quoting Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at
720)); Shuti, 828 F.3d at 446 (“While not a perfect match, these provisions undeniably bear a textual resemblance.” (citations omitted)); Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at 722
(concluding text of Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause near identical to
§ 16(b)).
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cuit reiterated) “[§ 16(b)] substitutes guesswork and caprice for fair notice and predictability.”70
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria,71 is the only circuit to have addressed the constitutionality of § 16(b) and not find it to be
void for vagueness.72 Following the categorical approach, the court in
Gonzalez-Longoria held, due to § 16(b)’s narrower definition, the statute
was significantly different from the statute at issue in Johnson and, therefore, was not as confusing to apply.73 The residual clause addressed in
Johnson instructed courts to determine whether a crime presented a “serious potential risk of physical injury.”74 Section 16(b), the court reasoned,
more narrowly requires a court to determine the risk of physical force during the commission of a crime.75 The Gonzalez-Longoria court stated that
§ 16(b) was narrowed even further because § 16(b) limits the risk inquiry
to the time when the crime took place, instead of before or after it occurred.76 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit found that § 16(b) provided more
“notice” to criminals and more guidance to judges as to what conduct
70. Golicov, 837 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Shuti, 828 F.3d at 450).
71. 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016).
72. See id. at 678–79 (holding § 16(b) not unconstitutionally vague). In Gonzalez-Longoria, the defendant, Gonzalez-Longoria, was convicted of two domestic
violence crimes, a misdemeanor assault, and a felony assault, in 2008. See id. at
672–73. “Gonzalez-Longoria, a Mexican citizen, was deported to Mexico.” Id. at
673. In 2014, Gonzalez-Longoria was found present in the United States and convicted of being in the United States illegally under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. See id. at 673.
During the sentencing phase for his 2014 conviction, Gonzalez-Longoria received
an enhanced sentence because his previous crimes were considered crimes of violence under § 16(b). See id. Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines section 2L1.2(b)(1)(c), committing an aggravated felony, the definition of which
includes a crime of violence, makes a felon eligible for an increased sentence. See
id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(c), cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
73. See Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 675–76 (acknowledging § 16(b) and
residual clause share similar features but holding § 16(b) more narrow and provided more guidance than residual clause); see also Koh, supra note 15, at 1174
(highlighting distinctions Gonzalez-Longoria court found between § 16(b) and
residual clause).
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(B)(ii) (20012) (emphasis added); see also GonzalezLongoria, 831 F.3d at 676 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and discussing
ACCA’s requirements).
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means . . . any
other offense that . . . by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used . . . .” (emphasis added));
see also Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 676 (discussing language of § 16(b) and emphasizing textual dissimilarities between provision and ACCA, including use of
word “force” in § 16(b) was more “definite” than “injury” as used in residual
clause).
76. See Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 676 (concluding specific time frame
pointedly forces courts to focus only on events occurring before or after crime
takes place); see also Koh, supra note 15, at 1174 (reiterating that court’s narrower
time frame makes statute “predictively more sound” (internal quotation omitted)).
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would be prohibited.77 The Fifth Circuit also held that the lack of enumerated crimes in § 16(b) prevented this statute from suffering from the
same confusion as the residual clause in Johnson.78 Unlike the other circuit courts, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the fundamental reason the
Supreme Court considered the residual clause as being too confusing was
because it was accompanied by “a confusing list of examples.”79
III. A RAY

OF

SUNSHINE: THIRD CIRCUIT’S RULING PROVIDES CLARITY
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 16(B)

ON THE

Following Johnson, there was confusion over whether a noncitizen
could be convicted of a crime of violence under the INA in the Third
Circuit.80 But by ruling in Baptiste that § 16(b) was “unconstitutionally
vague,” the Third Circuit joined the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.81 The Third Circuit’s holding focused on the two features of the
ACCA’s residual clause that the Johnson court determined made the clause
unconstitutional.82 The Third Circuit compared § 16(b) to the residual
clause and, finding them similar, held that § 16(b) suffered from the same
defects.83
A.

Facts of the Case

The petitioner, Carlton Baptiste, was originally from Trinidad and Tobago but became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in
77. See Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 677 (“Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which
looks to whether a commission of a crime involves a substantial risk of physical
force, is predictively more sound—both as to notice (to felons) and in application
(by judges)—than imputing clairvoyance as to potential risk of injury.” (footnote
omitted)).
78. See Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 677 (holding § 16(b) was “just like” many
other laws that use terms like “substantial risk” and do not list other crimes for
context).
79. See id. (concluding different verbiage, including lack of examples, used in
§ 16(b) “do not cause the same problems” as Johnson found existed in residual
clause (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015))); see also
Cody Davis, Just Another Burglary, CAMPBELL L. OBSERVER (Nov. 28, 2016), http://
campbelllawobserver.com/just-another-ordinary-burglary/ [https://perma.cc/H4
5B-Z7P5] (commenting that Fifth Circuit created circuit split by breaking with
holdings of other circuit courts regarding § 16(b)).
80. See Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 616–17 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
other circuit courts that have addressed unconstitutionality of § 16(b) and Third
Circuit would now “enter the fray”).
81. See id. at 616 (stating “[t]he Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
have considered the question and concluded that Johnson does render § 16(b) void
for vagueness.” (citations omitted)); id. at 621 (“§ 16(b) is unconstitutionally
vaugue”).
82. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015) (analyzing
case under ordinary case and serious risk inquiries); see also Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617
(applying ordinary case and serious risk inquiries to crime of violence and finding
them “indeterminate”).
83. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 621 (reiterating two inquiries of Johnson produced
same “unpredictability” in context of § 16(b)).
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1972.84 He was convicted of aggravated assault in 1978 and again in
2009.85 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) instituted removal
proceedings against Baptiste in 2013 because his 2009 conviction constituted a crime of violence, which made him deportable.86 DHS also later
claimed Baptiste was subject to removal for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).87 In October of
2013, an immigration judge determined Baptiste was removable under the
INA for both reasons.88 Baptiste appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), but the BIA agreed with the immigration judge’s decision
and dismissed the appeal.89 Baptiste subsequently appealed to the Third
Circuit.90
B.

The Third Circuit’s Analysis

Before deciding whether § 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague, the
Third Circuit addressed whether Baptiste’s conduct constituted a crime of
violence under the statute.91 The court began by examining the definition of a crime of violence.92 The court found that a crime of violence
must include a “substantial risk that force will be ‘actively employed’ ‘in
furtherance of the offense’” or that force will be intentionally used when
committing the crime.93 Having determined the requirements for estab84. See id. at 604 (describing facts of case). The specific facts underlying Baptiste’s assault convictions were not known to the court, however. See id.
85. See id. (examining petitioner’s criminal background). Baptiste received
one year in prison as punishment for the 1978 assault and five years in prison for
his 2009 conviction. See id.
86. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (West 20014) (allowing deportation
for defendants convicted of aggravated felony); see also Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 604
(explaining procedural history).
87. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 604 (reiterating DHS’s assertion two assaults constituted two crimes involving moral turpitude); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)
(“Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of misconduct . . . is
deportable.”). Although not defined by federal law, a crime involving moral turpitude is generally considered a crime involving conduct “contrary to the accepted
rules of” morality in society. See What Is a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude?, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://my.uscis.gov/helpcenter/article/what-is-acrime-involving-moral-turpitude [https://perma.cc/999E-2USV] (last visited Jan.
31, 2017).
88. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 604–05 (explaining all charges asserted against
Baptiste sustained at trial level).
89. See id. at 605 (describing Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision and
reasoning).
90. See id. (recognizing how case arrived at Third Circuit).
91. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 606 (“[I]n order to determine whether Baptiste’s
2009 Conviction was for an aggravated felony, we must first examine the definition
of a ‘crime of violence’ in 18 U.S.C. § 16.” (citation omitted)).
92. See id. at 606–07(defining “crime of violence” as used in INA).
93. See id. (quoting Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 471 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasizing need for intentional, not accidental, use of force to qualify as crime of
violence).
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lishing a crime of violence, the court then addressed whether the ordinary
case inquiry was the appropriate form of analysis under such circumstances.94 The court relied on the language of § 16(b) itself, which states
in part that a crime is a crime of violence if “by its nature” it includes a
substantial risk of force.95 The court held this language was consistent
with the ordinary case approach that instructs courts to also look
at whether an offense poses risk “by its nature.”96 However, when the
court attempted to apply the ordinary case approach to Baptiste’s conviction for second-degree aggravated assault, it had difficulty ascertaining
what the “ordinary” case would be.97 The court held § 16(b) provided
“little guidance.”98 Thus, the court found that there was a full spectrum of
conduct that could constitute second-degree aggravated assault, from conduct where the perpetrator intentionally harms another to conduct where
the perpetrator has no intent to harm another.99 The Third Circuit held
that “common sense” dictated that the ordinary case of second degree aggravated assault likely fell in the middle of this spectrum.100 Therefore,
Baptiste’s conduct likely included a substantial risk of force and constituted a crime of violence under the INA.101 However, the court noted
94. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 607–08 (asserting categorical, or “ordinary case,”
approach required by Supreme Court to evaluate whether conviction is in sync
with statute).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2017) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means . . . any
other offense that . . . by its nature, involves a substantial risk . . . .” (emphasis
added)); see also Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 608–10 (weighing government’s argument to
use ordinary case approach against Baptiste’s argument to use “least culpable conduct” approach). The least culpable conduct approach asks a court to look at the
least blameworthy conduct for which a person could be convicted under the statute. See id. at 608.
96. See id. at 610 (comparing exact language of crime of violence definition
under § 16(b) to Supreme Court’s ordinary case inquiry in Johnson).
97. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 611 (stating neither government nor Baptiste was
able articulate version of ordinary case for court to use and proceeding with its
own analysis of “ordinary case” of second-degree aggravated assault).
98. See id. (using New Jersey law to ascertain conduct typically associated with
ordinary case of assault and noting lack of other available sources). The court
asked: “How does one go about deciding what kind of conduct the ‘ordinary case’
of a crime involves? ‘A statistical analysis of the state reporter? A survey? Expert
evidence? Google? Gut instinct?’ ” See id. (quoting United States v. Mayer, 560
F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinkski, C.J., dissenting)).
99. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 611 (grouping potential conduct into three categories: “intentional use of force,” “substantial risk of intentional use of force,” and
“no risk of intentional use of force”).
100. See id. at 614 (finding ordinary case impossible to decipher and relying
on “common sense and judicial experience”). The Third Circuit did not explain
how common sense led them to believe an ordinary case would involve conduct
that falls in the middle of the spectrum between intentional force and no risk of
force. See id. at 611, 614.
101. See id. at 615 (applying conduct associated with ordinary case to § 16(b)
and holding § 16(b) encompasses such conduct).
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that its struggle to determine the ordinary case factored into its determination later in the decision that § 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague.102
After deciding Baptiste had committed a crime of violence,
the court questioned whether § 16(b)’s definition of crime of violence was
constitutional.103 The court undertook an analysis similar to that of the
other circuits that addressed § 16(b)’s constitutionality.104 The Third Circuit highlighted the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson and the two features in Johnson that made the ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutional:
the ordinary case inquiry and the serious risk inquiry.105 The Third Circuit used the Johnson categorical approach to analyze § 16(b) and attempted to compare an “ordinary case” to the facts in Baptiste.106
However, the Third Circuit held § 16(b) failed to provide judges with any
guidance as to what constitutes an ordinary case and ultimately contributed to the “indeterminate nature” of § 16(b).107
The Third Circuit also held § 16(b) failed to give any indication of
how much risk is required to constitute “substantial” risk.108 The Third
Circuit reasoned that the term “substantial risk” under § 16(b) was as
vague as the term “serious risk” in the ACCA’s residual clause.109 Un102. See id. at 611 (“[T]the indeterminate nature of the ordinary case inquiry
contributes to § 16(b)’s unconstitutionality.”).
103. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 615 (addressing Baptiste’s argument on appeal
that § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague).
104. Compare id. at 615–16 (analyzing § 16(b) by same standards Johnson court
analyzed ACCA’s residual clause), with Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th
Cir. 2016) (holding § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague after applying two factors
that made Johnson statute unconstitutional to § 16(b)), Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d
440, 447 (6th Cir. 2016) (same), United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 720 (7th
Cir. 2015) (same), and Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015)
(same).
105. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617 (stating ordinary and serious risk inquiries
applied to § 16(b) and residual clause because materially same statute).
106. See id. at 616 (stating categorical approach used to evaluate ACCA’s
residual clause and should be used for § 16(b) and adopting ordinary case inquiry
after evaluating other circuit court interpretations of Johnson). All of the circuit
courts that have addressed the issue, including the Third Circuit, agreed that the
categorical approach governs the analysis of § 16(b) and also applied the ordinary
case inquiry. See Golicov, 837 F.3d at 1072 (holding Johnson’s use of categorical
approach dictated categorical approach apply to § 16(b)); see also United States v.
Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 676 (en banc) (5th Cir. 2016) (determining
§ 16(b) and residual clause both require analysis under categorical approach);
Shuti, 828 F.3d at 446 (“The text of the immigration code at once compels a categorical approach to prior convictions”); Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at 722 (determining
categorical approach appropriate analysis for § 16(b)); Dimaya, 803 F.3d at
1114–15 (stating § 16(b) must be analyzed under same method of inquiry as
residual clause).
107. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 610–11 (stating court must guess at ordinary case
in this instance).
108. See id. at 617 (holding substantial risk inquiry too indeterminate).
109. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 617 (“A serious risk is equally as vague as a substantial risk.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Golicov, 837 F.3d at
1073)).
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like the Fifth Circuit, which held that the focus on the risk of “use of
force” under § 16(b) significantly distinguished the statute from the
ACCA’s focus on the risk of “physical injury,” the Third Circuit
stated that neither phrase was integral to deciding whether § 16(b) was
unconstitutional.110 The Third Circuit made clear that the statute
was vague because of the serious risk inquiry.111 This question of how
much risk is needed for a crime to qualify as a crime of violence was not
made by adding a “modifier” of force or injury.112 The Third Circuit also
determined that the lack of enumerated crimes in the § 16(b) crime of
violence definition did not make the statute any more determinate.113
The Third Circuit was also not persuaded by the argument that § 16(b)
was less vague than the ACCA’s residual clause because it did not include a
list of other crimes.114 While the list added to the confusion, it was not
ultimately why the statute was held unconstitutional.115
The Third Circuit held § 16(b) to be void for vagueness for all of the
same reasons the previous circuit courts had.116 Notably, the court indicated that had the substantial risk inquiry been applied to real-world facts
and not to a hypothesized ordinary case, the statute might have been upheld.117 Ultimately, however, the court held Baptiste could not be convicted under an unconstitutionally vague statute and he was, therefore, not
guilty of an aggravated felony under § 16(b).118 The Third Circuit held
Baptiste could still be removable under the INA for committing two
crimes involving moral turpitude and remanded the case to allow Baptiste
to pursue any forms of relief previously unavailable to him because of his
crime of violence conviction.119
110. Compare id. at 618 (acknowledging risk of injury term may encompass
more conduct but holding serious risk inquiry did not even address injury provision), with Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 676 (holding use of force more narrow
term than injury).
111. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 618 (determining ACCA’s residual clause, and
now § 16(b), failed because vagueness as to how much risk required, not type of
risk required).
112. See id. (explaining difference between force and injury was “distinction
without a difference”).
113. See id. at 620 (emphasizing lack of clarity).
114. Compare Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 620 (finding no language in Johnson to support idea that list of enumerated crimes was important to Johnson court’s analysis),
with Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 677 (holding list of enumerated crimes key reason residual clause unconstitutionally vague).
115. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 620 (holding § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague
with or without enumerated crimes).
116. For a discussion of reasons why the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits held § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague, see supra notes 52–69 and
accompanying text.
117. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 620–21 (asserting laws including substantial risk
inquiries constitutional when applied to real-world facts).
118. See id. at 621–23 (holding invalidity of § 16(b) meant Baptiste did not
commit aggravated felony per se).
119. See id. at 623 (providing conclusion of decision).
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The Importance of the Decision

The Third Circuit was correct in holding § 16(b) unconstitutionally
vague because it eliminated a criminal provision that produced non-uniform and unpredictable results in an area of law already rife with confusion.120 The Third Circuit emphasized that determining whether a
suspected criminal’s behavior falls under the crime of violence definition
forces judges to speculate about an abstract offense and how much risk
this abstract offense might require to qualify as a crime of violence.121 As
the court emphasized, this inquiry breeds unpredictability.122 Even the
Third Circuit’s own careful analysis of whether Baptiste’s conduct constituted a crime of violence did not yield a clear answer.123 Furthermore,
any law that causes an ordinary individual to guess at what conduct falls
under that law is impermissibly vague.124 This maxim is especially true
when the penalty for misconduct is as harsh as deportation.125 For noncitizens, a criminal conviction almost certainly means deportation.126
Therefore, the Third Circuit correctly decided to hold § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague, because it eliminated a clause that baffled both ordinary
people and courts as to what conduct was prohibited.127 Immigrants and
their attorneys in the Third Circuit will now have fair notice as to what
conduct is prohibited by law.128
120. See id. at 621 (asserting crime of violence created more arbitrariness than
was permissible under Constitution); see also Koh, supra note 15, at 1128 (highlighting terms used to describe confusing area of immigration law).
121. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 614 (stating lack of guidance forced court to rely
on “common sense and judicial experience” instead of uniform rules).
122. See id. at 621 (reiterating that ordinary case and serious potential risk
inquiries create erratic results).
123. See id. at 607–15 (attempting to determine ordinary case of second degree aggravated assault and assign amount of risk required for that assault to qualify as crime of violence).
124. See Johnson v. United Sates, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (asserting laws violate
Due Process Clause when lacking fair notice of conduct prohibited by law); see also
Koh, supra note 15, at 1130 (stating intent of vagueness doctrine is to eradicate
laws which create inconsistent applications).
125. See Koh, supra note 15, at 1130 (describing deportation as harsher than
criminal sanctions); see also Markowitz, supra note 10, at 1301–02 (explaining grave
consequences of deportation for many noncitizens and their families).
126. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (describing deportation
as “inevitable” for immigrants with criminal convictions); see also Koh, supra note
15, at 1172 (explaining severe consequences of criminal conviction on
noncitizen).
127. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at, 621 (holding § 16(b) could not survive under
Due Process Clause scrutiny, which requires individuals receive fair notice of behavior punished by law).
128. See Koh, supra note 15, at 1175 (stating holding § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague implicates broader concerns about necessity of notice). See generally Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–67 (explaining that Due Process Clause requires would-be
criminals to be on notice of what constitutes crime).
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The Third Circuit’s holding limits the conduct that qualifies as an
aggravated felony and avails litigants of new forms of relief from immigration removal proceedings.129 This decision provides clarity regarding
what conduct constitutes an aggravated felony under the INA and allows
immigrants to be eligible for certain forms of relief from which they had
previously been barred due to their crime of violence conviction.130 What
remains uncertain, however, is whether this holding will apply
retroactively.131
A.

Clarity on Conduct Constituting an Aggravated Felony

The Third Circuit’s elimination of § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague
narrows the conduct considered an aggravated felony.132 Under the INA,
an aggravated felony is defined by a list of crimes, such as rape, murder,
child pornography, and trafficking, in addition to a crime of violence.133
Prior to Baptiste, the crime of violence provision essentially functioned as a
catchall within this list.134 Without this catchall provision in the Third
Circuit, attorneys for the government will have to charge an immigrant
with one of the other, more specific aggravated felonies named in the statute in order to subject the immigrant to removal.135 For practitioners representing noncitizens, this decision provides more guidance regarding
129. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 623 (invalidating crime of violence as legitimate
crime under aggravated felony definition of INA); see also Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, supra note 11, at 28 (stating voidance of § 16(b) allows those formerly convicted of crime of violence to pursue new
forms of relief).
130. See Kalar, supra note 22 (explaining confusion caused by crime of violence statute); see also Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, supra note 11, at 28 (stating options for relief available to those without
crime of violence convictions).
131. Cf. Baptiste, 841 F.3d 601 (lacking any statement about whether holding
applies retroactively). See generally Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268
(2016) (applying Johnson retroactively).
132. See Wickham, supra note 26 (finding voidance of § 16(b) removes individuals convicted of crimes of violence from INA statute conduct that can make
noncitizens eligible for deportation); see also Challenging the Use of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
in Deportation Proceedings, WILSON LAW GROUP: BLOG (Feb. 16, 2016), https://wilsonlg.com/immigration/blog/when-conviction-crime-violence-evolving-interpretation-18-usc-section-16 [https://perma.cc/QSG4-4462] (recognizing that now fewer
offenses considered crime of violence).
133. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2014) (defining aggravated
felony under INA).
134. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 24 (asserting § 16(b) serves as “catchall” for aggravated felony
definition).
135. See id. at 25 (explaining removal of § 16(b) as crime does not prevent
government from prosecuting individual based on other crimes listed in aggravated felony definition); see also Brief for Respondent at 58–59, Lynch v. Dimaya,
137 S. Ct. 31 (2016) (No. 15-1498), 2016 WL 7321783 (stating government still
able bring aggravated felony charges on other grounds).
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precisely what conduct is included within the felony definition.136 For instance, if noncitizen clients are charged with crimes and need to know
whether they should plead guilty, lawyers are now in a better position to
advise their clients on the effects these pleas will have on their immigration statuses.137
B.

New Forms of Relief Are Available

The Third Circuit’s decision also means immigrants are now eligible
for relief from which they had been previously been barred due to their
crime of violence convictions.138 Noncitizens who had been convicted
specifically of crimes of violence under the INA were ineligible for certain
forms of relief from deportation.139 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, individuals
placed in removal proceedings can have their proceedings cancelled by
the United States Attorney General if they have resided in the United
States for more than ten years, they have “good moral character,” and if
returning to their country of origin would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”140 The statute, however, expressly carves out
an exception which states that if an individual is convicted of a crime of
violence, they are not eligible for cancellation of their removal proceedings; thus, prior to the Third Circuit’s decision in Baptiste, immigrants convicted under § 16(b) were not eligible for this form of relief.141
After Baptiste, noncitizens in the Third Circuit are now eligible for
forms of relief to that were previously not available to them.142 Practitioners representing immigrants may now have more options available to help
136. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 5–18 (listing crimes where no clear answer regarding whether
each is considered crime of violence); see also Kelly Knaub, 10th Cir. Finds INA
Definition of ‘Crime of Violence’ Vague, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2016, 5:31 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/841550/10th-circ-finds-ina-definition-of-crime-of-violence-vague [https://perma.cc/6Q3R-2BRV] (explaining confusion over § 16(b)
for both noncitizens charged and judges deciding on cases).
137. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 6–7 (describing difficulty of noncitizens to understand consequences of possible guilty plea to crime).
138. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 28 (explaining possible forms of relief previously unavailable to
noncitizens with crime of violence conviction).
139. See id. at 25 n.21 (describing forms of relief those convicted of crime of
violence not entitled to use).
140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), (2) (2012) (listing criteria for cancellation of
removal); see also Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015) (reiterating
elements noncitizen must meet to be eligible for cancellation of removal).
141. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (stating individuals convicted of aggravated felonies barred from cancellation of removal relief).
142. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 28 (explaining invalidation of § 16(b) means noncitizens not automatically barred from certain forms of relief).
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their clients terminate their removal proceedings.143 For DHS attorneys,
these new forms of relief are not a guarantee that the Attorney General
will find that a noncitizen meets the criteria for cancellation of removal.144
So, while the Baptiste ruling on § 16(b) allows immigrants to seek cancellation of removal, it does not guarantee that individuals will receive cancellation.145 The cancellation of removal remains up to the Attorney
General.146
C.

Does Baptiste Apply Retroactively?

One question that remains for practitioners and their clients is
whether the Baptiste ruling will apply retroactively.147 Neither the Third
Circuit nor any of the other circuits addressing the constitutionality of
§ 16(b) have addressed whether voiding the statute will affect prior
cases.148 However, there might be guidance on this issue stemming from
the Johnson decision.149 The decision in Johnson was determined to apply
retroactively by the Supreme Court in Welch v. United States.150 In Welch,
the Supreme Court held that a ruling that substantively changes the conduct or the people punishable by the statute at issue must be retroactive.151 Given the Third Circuit’s heavy reliance on Johnson and statement
143. See Koh, supra note 15, at 1183 (recognizing invalidation of § 16(b) as
opportunity to challenge deportation statutes); see also Challenging the Use of 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) in Deportation Proceedings, supra note 132 (describing voidance of
§ 16(b) as beneficial for those fighting deportation proceedings).
144. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 28 (acknowledging Attorney General has ultimate control over
whether noncitizen receives cancellation).
145. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b (West 2008) (stating aggravated felony
can bar individuals from cancellation of removal eligibility and listing circumstances that allow immigrants to receive, or prevent them from receiving, cancellation of removal proceedings); see also Brief of National Immigration Project of the
National Lawyers Guild, supra note 11, at 28 (“Thus, to the extent that § 16(b)’s
invalidation may have an impact on the government’s ability to deport noncitizens,
it is a limited one.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1692 (2013))).
146. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 28 (reiterating cancellation decided by Attorney General).
147. See generally Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding
§ 16(b) unconstitutionally vague but not commenting on whether holding
retroactive).
148. See generally id. (remaining silent on possible retroactive application); see
also generally Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1073–74 (10th Cir. 2016) (same);
United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(same); Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 448 (6th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v.
Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2015) (same); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d
1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (same).
149. See generally Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (holding decision in Johnson applied retroactively).
150. 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016); see id. at 1265 (determining unconstitutionally
vague statutes dealing with substantive rules apply retroactively).
151. See id. (describing effect of Johnson as altering reach of ACCA, as well as
altering people and conduct regulated by ACCA).
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that the ACCA’s residual clause and § 16(b) are essentially the same, it
would seem likely that Baptiste would also apply retroactively.152 Additionally, the Third Circuit’s § 16(b) ruling that affects conduct for which a
noncitizen can be deported falls directly under the Welch proposition that
a statute that changes punishable conduct applies retroactively.153
For practitioners representing clients currently in deportation proceedings who were convicted of a crime of violence, a retroactive application would be beneficial.154 These clients could have their previous
convictions vacated and be able to seek forms of relief previously unavailable to them.155 Additionally, a retroactive holding would be helpful to
those immigrants who have already been removed from the United States
due to a crime of violence conviction but wish to reenter the country.156
As it stands now, immigrants previously removed from the country for aggravated felonies are not allowed to reenter for at least twenty years, if not
more.157 However, if convictions for crimes of violence were vacated retroactively, these individuals could be immediately eligible to return.158
For government attorneys, this could mean relitigating old cases or finding new grounds for a noncitizen’s removability.159
V.

CONCLUSION

In Padilla v. Kentucky,160 the Supreme Court noted, “[d]eportation or
removal . . . is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens
convicted of crimes.”161 However, the Third Circuit’s recent decision in
Baptiste provides clarity to noncitizens and their attorneys regarding what
conduct is subject to punishment under the INA’s aggravated felony provi152. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 621 (holding § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague
because it was materially same as ACCA’s residual clause and failed same twoprong analysis as residual clause).
153. See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264–65 (explaining that change to any substantive rule has retroactive effect).
154. See generally Wickham, supra note 26 (describing crime of violence conviction as “death knell” in deportation decision).
155. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 28 (explaining benefits of removal of crime of violence
conviction).
156. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B) (2012) (listing individuals not allowed into
United States, including those with “multiple criminal convictions”).
157. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(9)(A) (stating limits to reentry for any noncitizen
who committed crime of violence and was removed from United States).
158. See id. (stating five-year reentry ban for noncitizen previously removed
and did not previously commit crime in United States).
159. See Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild,
supra note 11, at 28 (explaining without crime of violence, government still retains
many grounds for removing noncitizen).
160. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
161. See id. at 360 (describing harsh consequences of deportations).
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sion.162 The Baptiste court limits the crimes that could qualify as an aggravated felony and opens up new forms of relief for individuals who
previously were ineligible.163 The Third Circuit rendered its decision at a
pivotal time, as the question of § 16(b)’s constitutionality is currently
pending before the Supreme Court.164 In the fall of 2016, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the Dimaya
case.165 Until the Dimaya case is decided, § 16(b) remains unconstitutional in the Third Circuit.166 In the meantime, practitioners in the Third
Circuit now have a better understanding of what conduct subjects a noncitizen to removal and are better able to advise their clients of the immigration consequences of certain criminal offenses than they were before
Baptiste.167
162. See, e.g., Challenging the Use of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) in Deportation Proceedings,
supra note 132 (stating fewer crimes now constitute aggravated felony); see also
supra notes 120–28 and accompanying text for analysis of effect of Baptiste
decision.
163. See supra notes 91–119 and accompanying text for analysis of Baptiste; see
also Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, supra
note 11, at 28 (finding voidance of § 16(b) means individuals not barred from
some forms of relief).
164. See generally Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 31 (2016).
165. See generally id. (granting certiorari in September of 2016 to hear
Dimaya).
166. See Hessick, supra note 26 (explaining that Johnson was decided before
Justice Gorsuch was confirmed for vacant Supreme Court seat and that Johnson
decision garnered six-vote majority).
167. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (emphasizing importance of attorneys to provide accurate advice to clients facing criminal
convictions).
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